Perry’s Dialogue

In Perrys Dialogue, he introduces three fictional characters to explore the cin unmatched casept of ain indistinguishability. This affair arises as the character, Gretchen Weirob, lays on her deathbed seeking consolation from her friend, Sam Miller, and former student, Dave Cohen, to plow the accident of her option aft(prenominal) death. Weirobs view is that people argon identified by their bodies and that their bided existence relies on the existence of their active bodies (Perry, 319).In this paper, I ordain argue on behalf of her viewpoint approaching psycheal identity through Lockes memory theory using the note of hand that real memory can only be associated with the eubstance experiencing it. in-personised identity has proven to be a very controversial event in this dialogue. By the second base night, it was argued to be defined neither by the somatic existence nor the existence of an immaterial soul (320). Instead, identity is approached by the concept of per son-stages (322).This idea implies that a person lives in consecutive loades of mind connected in a logical manner. In this case, each stretch of consciousness indicates the wholly thoughts and emotions experienced by a person at a given moment in time (322). This leads to the Memory surmise of personal identity, which Miller suggested according to his readings on Locke. It basicall(a)y states that all the early(prenominal) events occurring inwardly this stream of consciousness forms memory and our personal identity consists of the compendium of memory that can be traced linearly through it (322).Weirob was not adapted to find any flaws in this theory. However, many flaws would surface without the examination of what constitutes as memory? Weirob brings up the comparison of real and unmistakable memory due to the fortuity of deception where a person may seems to mobilize (323) something wholly inaccurate. Real memory is then defined as an experience remembered by the pe rson who was present at the time of that experience(324).App atomic number 18nt memory is when some unity seems to remember but was not truly present at the experience in question (324). In the end, the real remember is the one whose memories were caused in the duty kind of way (324) which led Weirob to conclude that a person is legitimate sort of causal process. (324) This continued to support her belief that personal identity is coexistent with bodied continuity as all her memories were formed by the actions and whiz activity of her body. With a stroke of ngenuity, Miller was able to scrap her belief that personal identity lies solely within the confines of bodily lay by stating that one can identify his/herself without examination of his or her physical body (320). He says that a person is able to disturb up and realize that they are the person they were the day before, prior to opening move his/her eyes. He further proves this using Kafkas Metamorphosis, which involves the instance of someone waking up in the body of a cockroach (320). This person liquid maintains the sameness of person despite the difference of body.Earlier on, Weirob had brought up the case of anticipation. She had reason that in order for her to accept the possibly of life after death, she essential believe that she can exist in an other(a) form in which she would be able to anticipate the experiences of her future self and remember the experiences of her preceding(a) (323). As Miller was able to dispute her belief that personal identity is only bodily identity, he then tempts her to imagine that in that respect will be someone in the future who will remember the dialogue they are having and all her away experiences.However, this fails to comforts Weirob as she argues that this merely suggests the possibility of a deluded imposter harboring her memories (323). Once again the issue of real versus patent memory detains Miller in his efforts. This led to the introduction of an additional childbed to Millers suggestion. To provide the distinction between real and apparent memory, the heavenly person must now be the person who actually performed the actions that he/she remembers (323). So if Weirob can imagine such a person being she, then the possibility of her survival is ensured.Nevertheless, this proves to be too evasive for Weirob to accept. She argues that There is no assurance that the heavenly being will be identical to her as opposed to exactly similar(325). She says that if theology were able to give rise one such being on heaven, what is to prevent him from creating two or even three? Since God is all-powerful and not limited in his abilities, he should be able to do an infinite number of Gretchen Weirobs, all of whom would hold her memories (325). These Gretchen Weirobs cannot all be her, so the possibility of her survival is once again irrational.Cohen then points out that Miller was asked only to provide the possibility of survival, so if Weriob were to imagine that God, being benevolent, choose to create only one heavenly Gretchen Weirob, then she cannot deny the possibility of her survival (325). To this Weirob replies that she cannot base her survival on such insubstantial conditions she cannot tolerate that her survival depends on the refine resemblanceship between her memory to the memory of the heavenly being as well as the lack of competition of other heavenly beings(325).She says that if there is a possibility if two heavenly Gretchen Weirobs, she would be neither of them as one cannot be identical to two then memory unaccompanied cannot provide the basis for identity. Therefore, even if there were to be only one heavenly being containing her memory, she cannot confirm that it will be identical to her (326). I agree with Weirobs belief that she will cease to exist upon the decease of her body. From a biological point of view, there is no earthly proof that suggest the continuation of a person afte r the end of his/her brain function.Like Weirob suggested, it is her brain that involves the storage of information including the accumulation of her memories(321). If her brain were to stop functioning, all her memories would logically be lost. Meanwhile, there is the case where the body can continue to function without support from the brain. This is commonly known as a coma, a state in which a person is without brain activity and within this state of mind that person can be pronounced legally dead by a qualified physician. Now on the progeny of survival after death, the existence of a God must be involved.In this instance, the identity of a person can be suggested to continue if God were to create a heavenly being containing all of the deceased past memories. The possibility of survival through this case is disrupted as Weriob proved that these beings would be nothing more than exactly similar to her(323). She maintains that memory unaccompanied cannot ensure the essence of h er personal identity, as God can create many heavenly beings containing her memories out of which one of them would be her (323).Her idea of bodily continuity is proven to be the only rational method to sympathise her existence as her steam of consciousness containing all the memories that comprises her personal identify ends with her death. However, Weirobs belief seems to exclude those who are distorted or incapable(p) in their ability to store memory. For example, in the case of the hypnosis mentioned in the second night, the rememberer induced to remember Weirobs memories is disrupted in his/her stream of consciousness. 323) Yet, after the removal of the trance, he/she will continue to exist as him/herself. Weirob excessively mentioned people who seem to remember being Napoleon losing the battle of waterloo 323). Although these poeple are visibly not Napoleon, they are also not considered to be absent despite lack of personal identity. Other cases include patients of Alzheim ers affection who will gradually lose all their memories or those living with psychical illness who are under delusions of who they really are.These people are manifestly experiencing inaccurate representations for their personal identity. Nevertheless, this does not prevent these individuals from existing. While it is correct that these individuals exist, I can argue that there is a distinction between look to exist and actually existing. Individuals suffering from delusions exist within their own mind, without relation to the their actual environment. They seem to exist, either as Napoleon or as Gretchen Weirob, in that stretch of consciousness.The mind is inarguably still a part of the body so while they may be not physically experiencing these events, their body, or more specifically their brain, is still needed for the creation of these memories. Therefore, they will sweep up the same laws of existence as any normal person. On the other hand, those who are suffering from A lzheimers, or any form of head suffering that forces them to lose their memories are simultaneously losing their identity. As stretches of their streams of consciousness fade away, their personal identity diminishes until there is nothing left to distinguish them from an empty shell, which is their body.